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SCALING THE PATENT SYSTEM
CHRISTINA MULLIGAN & TIMOTHY B. LEE*
ABSTRACT
Why do firms in some industries ignore patents when develop-
ing new products? This paper posits a simple answer to this long-
puzzling question: firms ignore patents because they are unable to
discover the patents their activities might infringe. The costs of
finding relevant patents, which we call "discovery costs," are prohib-
itively high.
Not all industries face high patent discovery costs. Chemical
patents are "indexable," meaning that relevant patents can be effi-
ciently retrieved by chemical formula. As a result, discovery costs in
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries are low, and inadver-
tent infringement by firms in these industries is rare. But many
other patent categories are not indexable, and in some cases that
makes avoiding infringement practically impossible. In software, for
example, patent clearance by all firms would require many times
more hours of legal research than all patent lawyers in the United
States can bill in a year. The result has been an explosion of patent
litigation.
This paper attacks two core premises of patent law-that par-
ties are always able to respect each other's patent rights, and that
firms should be punished for infringement even if they could not
have avoided it. It concludes with several suggestions for how to
change the patent system to alleviate the problems created by non-
indexable patents.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1945, Friedrich Hayek wrote a famous essay called "The Use
of Knowledge in Society."' Responding to advocates for greater cen-
tral planning of economic activity, Hayek pointed out that their the-
ories assumed that knowledge about economic circumstances could
be taken as "given" to economic decision-makers, an assumption he
argued was unreasonable. 2 Knowledge about the state of the econ-
omy-about what resources exist and what goods and services con-
sumers demand-is dispersed among millions of people. Gathering
the information together in one place would be impractical, and
even if it were done, no economic decision-maker could possibly
absorb it all.3
The tendency to implicitly assume that economic actors are
omniscient is a common pitfall of theoretical social science. By defi-
nition, the theorist knows everything there is to be known about the
stylized model he has invented. Theorists often implicitly assume
that economic actors automatically have the information they need
to make decisions.4 Indeed, such assumptions may be essential to
building a tractable model of the world. But the failure to ponder
the feasibility of acquiring and using information can lead to flawed
conclusions.
1. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. ECON. REv. 519
(1945).
2. Id. at 519.
3. Id. at 524.
4. See id. at 519.
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The contemporary patent debate suffers from this blind spot.
Each patent is a demand that the world refrain from practicing a
claimed art without the patent holder's permission. Potential in-
fringers can only comply with this demand if they are aware of the
patent's existence. On a blackboard or in the pages of a law review
article, it is easy to assume that everyone knows about every patent.
But the real world is not so simple. To avoid infringement, a
firm must expend resources to learn about potentially relevant pat-
ents. Typically this means hiring patent lawyers to conduct patent
searches, which may or may not be affordable or effective.5 In this
paper, we'll call the costs of such information-gathering activities
the patent system's "discovery costs."6 One criterion for a well-func-
tioning patent system-or any system of property-like rights-is that
discovery costs be low enough to make it economically feasible for
firms to obtain the information they need to comply with the law.7
5. For example, a recent Supreme Court case presumed that "simply asking
an attorney to examine a product and compare it to the data base of existing pat-
ents is not a dependable way to see if a product is likely to infringe a patent."
Stephen M. McJohn, Top Tens in 2011: Patent & Trademark Cases, 10 Nw.J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 313, 317 (2012) (discussing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011)). See also Global-Tech Appliances, 131 S.Ct. at 2064 (describ-
ing how a patent attorney failed to locate a deep fryer patent that his client's inven-
tion infringed).
6. Discovery costs are one of the types of transaction costs identified by Ron-
ald Coase in his seminal essay, The Problem of Social Cost. Coase explained:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what
terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the con-
tract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely
costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be
carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional
Model, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1165, 1167-68 (2008) (explaining Coase's description of
transaction costs "in the context of contracting for inventions"). Discovery costs as
used in this article are notably not costs associated with the discovery period before
a trial.
7. Clarisa Long has argued that the patent system does not "raise the informa-
tion costs of searching and avoiding [most patented goods] unduly." Clarisa Long,
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REv. 465, 524 (2004). See id. at
532-33 ("[Specialized and knowledgeable practitioners] will be able to draw on
their preexisting knowledge of goods and technologies in the relevant field and as
a result search costs will be lower than if they were not knowledgeable. . .. Requir-
ing a small set of people to search exhaustively is not as socially expensive [in
patent law as searches by many are in copyright]."); see also id. at 503 ("We would
expect legal rules to force disclosure . . . , and . . . increase duties of avoidance,
when the class of goods is small . . ,when the goods affect fewer observers, when
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Thinking explicitly about discovery costs is a powerful tool for
understanding the dysfunctions of the patent system. As we will see,
discovery costs are relatively low in pharmaceuticals and other
chemical industries.8 As a consequence, the patent system serves
these industries relatively well. In contrast, discovery costs in the
software industry are so high that most firms do not even try to
avoid infringement.9 Unsurprisingly, software is a major contribu-
tor to the recent spike in patent litigation.
We will argue that this disparity can be explained by the fact
that pharmaceutical inventions can be organized by chemical
formula, while no analogous organizational scheme exists for
software inventions.
I.
SCALE AND BIG-O NOTATION
Our subject is what software engineers call "scalability," the
ability of a system to perform well as the "problem size" increases.' 0
A common experience for companies that build online services is
to have a system that worked flawlessly with a limited number of test
users grind to a halt when it is released to the public and used by
millions of people." Often, a system's bottlenecks only become ap-
parent when it is used at its full capacity.
He didn't put it in these terms, but Hayek was essentially argu-
ing that central planning doesn't scale. Centralized economic deci-
sion-making can work in a small tribe whose chief knows every tribe
member personally. But in a modern economy with millions of
households, a single, central decision-maker would become a bot-
tleneck, causing the entire system to grind to a halt. So modern
societies have developed other mechanisms, such as the price sys-
those observers have greater tolerance for incurring costs of understanding the
good, and when the disclosed information is objective and readily verifiable. This
is indeed what we see with the patent form."). This paper disagrees with Long's
view insofar as this paper argues that the costs of discovering whether an indepen-
dently-created invention has already been patented are actually unduly high.
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. See infra Part III.D.
10. See generally CAL HENDERSON, BUILDING SCALABLE WEB SITES: BUILDING,
SCALING, AND OPTIMIZING THE NEXT GENERATION OF WEB APPLICATIONS, ch. 9
(2006).
11. For example, Twitter has experienced repeated service outages as its user
base has grown. See, e.g., Joe Tacopino, World Cup causes Twitter outages, more fail
whales' to come, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 17, 2010, http://wmw.nydailynews.com/
news/money/world-cup-twitter-outages-fail-whales-article-1.180774.
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tem, to coordinate economic decisions in a decentralized, scalable
fashion.
Scalability is also an important issue for the patent system. In
an island nation of, say, 100,000 people, the patent system's discov-
ery costs would not be a cause for concern. There might be a few
patents granted each week, and it would be reasonable to simply
expect every firm to read every patent. In contrast, the U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office issues several thousand patents per week.12
Clearly, it is not possible to expect every American firm to read and
understand every issued patent. So a scalable patent system needs
to offer firms efficient mechanisms to sort through those thousands
of patents to find the ones that are relevant to them.
To think rigorously about whether patent searching is scalable,
we're going to borrow the standard notation computer scientists
use to talk about scalability, called "Big-O" notation.' 3 Big-O nota-
tion is a way to succinctly summarize how quickly a function grows
relative to its input. To illustrate this concept, we'll use the example
of a hypothetical chess tournament. Imagine you are planning a
chess tournament with n players. You have only one chess set, so
games have to be played in sequence. You are deciding between two
tournament styles: a round-robin tournament in which every player
plays one game with every other player, or a single-elimination tour-
nament in which players are paired off and the loser of each game
is dropped from the tournament.
If we assume that each game lasts one hour, and there are no
breaks, the round-robin tournament will take n(n-l)/ 2 hours for n
players.' 4 If n is large, the tournament will be intolerably long. For
example, if n=100 the tournament will take more than six months!
Now consider the single-elimination tournament. If we again
assume that each game lasts one hour, then the entire tournament
will take n-1 hours. This is much more manageable; with n=100
players the tournament will take about four days.
12. U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2010, UNITED STATES PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.
pdf (noting that 219,614 utility patents were granted in 2010, with an average of
4223 utility patents granted per week).
13. See Paul E. Black, big-O notation, in DICTIONARY OF ALGORITHMS AND DATA
STRUCTURES [ONLINE] (Paul E. Black, ed. 2010), http://www.nist.gov/dads/
HTML/bigOnotation.html (last updated August 31, 2012); JoN KLEINBERG & EVA
TARDoS, ALGORITHM DESIGN 36-37, 47-56 (1st ed. 2006).
14. If each of n players played every other contestant, the tournament would
take n(n-1) hours. However, this would result in each pair playing each other twice,
because after player A challenged player B, player B would then challenge player
A. So we divide by two to prevent duplicate games.
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To find the "Big-O" class of a function like n(n-1)/2, one ex-
pands the function to 1/2n2-1/2n and drops everything other than the
fastest-growing exponent, leaving n .15 We can then say that the
round robin tournament takes 0(n2) time to complete, given n par-
ticipants. In contrast, the single-elimination tournament takes just
0(n) time to complete.
This means that round-robin tournaments scale poorly com-
pared to single-elimination tournaments. Doubling the number of
players roughly doubles the length of the single-elimination tourna-
ment, while it increases the length of the round-robin tournament
by a factor of four.16 For large tournaments, this effect will dwarf
other considerations in choosing between the two options.
II.
ANALYZING THE PATENT SYSTEM'S SCALABILITY
WITH BIG-O NOTATION
A. Simple Model of the Patent System
Now we use Big-O notation to evaluate the scalability of the
patent system. We start by constructing a stylized model of the pat-
ent-eligible widget industry. Assume there are n firms producing
widgets and each firm produces just one type of widget and holdsjust one patent. We will relax these assumptions later, but the sim-
plicity of this model makes it a good starting point.
Each firm's widget may infringe multiple competitors' patents,
and firms spend resources to learn which patents they must license
or invent around. How large are these discovery costs? Suppose that
the only known way to find the patents related to a particular wid-
get is to examine all widget patents, and that lawyers can always
correctly determine whether a widget violates a patent simply by
15. Factors besides the fastest-growing exponent are dropped because their
effect on the length of time it takes to solve a problem becomes mathematically
insignificant as the problem size increases.
16. We can demonstrate this by plugging p players and 2p players into the
equations for determining the length of a single elimination and round robin
tournament: n-1 and 1/2n 2 1/2n, respectively. P players could finish a single elimina-
tion tournament in p-1 hours and could finish a round robin tournament in 1/2p
'/2p hours. To determine how long it would take 2p players to finish a tournament,
we replace "n" in the equation with "2p". Twice as many players would take almost
twice as long to finish a single elimination tournament as p players-2p-1 hours
compared to p-1 hours. In contrast, a round robin tournament of 2p players would
take 1/2(2p!-'/2(2p) hours, which multiplies out to 2p2-p hours. Whereas the round
robin tournament of p players took almost about 1/2p2 hours, the tournament of 2p
players takes almost 2p2 hours-quadrupling the time even though the players
only doubled.
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reading the patent claims.17 Suppose also that it takes a patent law-
yer one hour to determine whether a given widget-related product
infringes a given widget patent. Then each of the n widget firms will
need to pay a patent lawyer to examine the patents held by each of
the n-1 other widget firms. That's n-1 hours of work for each firm,
leading to an industry-wide discovery cost of n(n-1), or n2 - n, billa-
ble hours. In other words, the discovery costs of the patent system
are O(n) for each firm, and O(n2) across the entire widget industry.
This means that the patent system scales poorly for widgets.18 If
the number of widget firms (and, with it, the number of patents)
doubles, the industry's total legal bills increase by a factor of four.
In an industry with many firms, the patent system's discovery costs
would be a large burden; they could even dwarf some firms' reve-
nues altogether. For example, in a widget industry in which 30,000
firms had one patent apiece and could review one patent per hour,
each firm would need to hire around fifteen full-time patent attor-
neys, resulting an industry-wide total discovery cost of almost a bil-
lion billable hours.' 9 That's a lot, even for deep-pocketed widget
companies.
B. Indexing Lowers Discovery Costs
The above analysis assumes that every firm must examine every
patent in some detail, but this is not practical in a world where
there are hundreds of thousands of valid patents. Ideally, firms in
real industries would have ways to quickly find the small number of
17. In the real world, lawyers frequently cannot state with certainty whether a
given activity actually infringes a particular patent. In this paper, we will largely set
this issue to the side and assume counterfactually that lawyers can always deter-
mine whether a particular activity infringes a particular patent in a reasonable
amount of time. For further reading on the challenges of claim construction and
determining the scope of patents, see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Inter-
pretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLAi L. REv. 57 (2005); Christopher A.
Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47
Wm. & MARY L. REv 49 (2005);.Jeanne Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U.
CHI. L. REv. 719 (2009); Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecu-
tion, 21 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 179 (2007).
18. Running time can get much worse for computer scientists, who sometimes
must solve problems that can only be solved in non-polynomial time, such as O(k")
for some constant k and number of inputs n.
19. Each of the 30,000 firms would need to hire a patent attorney to examine
29,999 other patents, which takes 1 hour per patent, so attorneys would spend a
total of 30,000 * 29,999 * 1 hour = 899,970,000 hours. Assuming a typical attorney
bills 2000 hours of work per year, each firm would need just shy of 15 attorneys to
examine 29,999 patents.
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patents that relate to its own products and ignore the rest. The abil-
ity to do this depends on a good system of organization.
We can see the power of organization in the system of real
property. Counties do not store real property records in a random
order. Rather, they place them in a predictable order based on
their geographic location. Filing them in a predictable order allows
rapid record retrieval in the same way that alphabetization allows
rapid lookup of words in a dictionary. In Big-O terms, retrieving
one item from a well-organized collection is roughly an 0(1), or
constant-time, operation.20 If a clerk needed to retrieve each record
once during the year, he would only spend 0(n) time sorting
through filing cabinets, where n is the total number of records.
By way of contrast, we can imagine a county with an incompe-
tent records clerk who placed property records in filing cabinets at
random. In this county, the property system would have the same
scaling problem as widget patents: as the number of parcels in-
creased, looking up who owned any given parcel would become
more and more time-consuming. The only way to find a particular
record would be to examine every record, one at a time. That
means retrieving all records related to a particular parcel would be
an 0(n) operation. If a clerk needed to retrieve each record once
during the year, he would spend 0(n2) time sorting through filing
cabinets. In a county with many parcels, the system would be com-
pletely unmanageable.
The ability to organize claims to real property such that they
can be quickly retrieved depends on the existence of a standardized
and predictable representation such as geographic coordinates. If a
group of items has such a representation, we call that group "index-
able," because the representation makes it possible to build an effi-
cient index of the items. Whether a set is indexable or not depends
on its inherent properties. Dictionary words are indexable because
they can be organized alphabetically. Real property claims are in-
dexable because they can be organized by their geographic
location.
20. Constant-time operations, or operations that take 0(1) time, take the
same amount of time to complete, regardless of the problem size. Depending on
the details of the filing method, lookup times might be a slow-growing function
like O(log2n). The difference between 0(1) and 0(log2n) is not large, and we're
going to pretend that they are the same to simplify the presentation.
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C. Example: Chemical Patents are Indexable
Are patents indexable? This is a difficult question to answer in
general, since the answer varies by technology class. But at least one
category of patents-chemical patents-is already being indexed.
The Food and Drug Administration produces a publication
called Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evalua-
tions.2' This publication, colloquially known as the "Orange
Book,"22 allows people to look up pharmaceutical patents based on
the chemical formula of the active ingredient. A German organiza-
tion, FIZ Karlsruhe, offers an electronic database called STN, which
allows researchers to pull up all patents and other literature on par-
ticular molecules.23
Chemical formulas allow efficient retrieval of chemical patents,
just as geographic coordinates allow efficient retrieval of real estate
records. In other words, chemical patents are indexable. That
means that finding a patent based on its chemical formula is ap-
proximately an 0(1) operation, just as it is for real property records.
Recall that doubling the number of widget patents doubled
every widget firm's discovery costs, since each firm was forced to
look at twice as many patents to weed out the irrelevant ones. In
contrast, doubling the number of chemical patents does not in-
crease chemical firms' discovery costs because a database like STN
can quickly filter out irrelevant patents, no matter how many of
them are in the database. So the patent system scales well for
chemicals.
D. Example: Software Patents Are Disorganized
Unfortunately, few, if any, non-chemical patents seem to be in-
dexable. To be sure, there are searchable databases that include
non-chemical patents. 24 But few, if any, non-chemical categories of
patentable inventions have a standardized and comprehensive
scheme for classifying patentable subject matter. That means that
there may not be a faster way to find all patents relevant to a partic-
21. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (32d ed. 2012) [hereinafter "Or-
ange Book"], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentAp-
provalProcess/UCM071436.pdf.
22. Id. at iv (describing the origins of the nickname "Orange Book").
23. See STN INTERNATIONAL, http://www.stn-intemational.de/index.php?id=
123 (last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
24. See, e.g., DELPHION, http://www.delphion.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2012)
(cited in Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539, 585 n.208
(2009)); PATBASE, http://www.patbase.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
2972012]
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 68:289
ular product than to simply examine all of the patents in a particu-
lar technology class, one at a time.
We will focus on software patents, which provide a particularly
good illustration of the problem.
As we have already noted, it would be completely impracticable
for a firm to read every patent. So patent lawyers use a variety of
methods to guess at what patents they should look at. These meth-
ods include searching by keyword, patent classification,25 inventor
or patent assignee, and searching for patents that cite to and are
cited in similar patent applications.26
The keyword search is crucial, but searching by keyword hardly
approaches the speed and certainty of searching an indexable sys-
tem. A firm producing a new word processor might search for pat-
ents containing phrases like "word processor," "page layout,"
"printing," and so forth. But in the absence of a precise, standard-
ized scheme for classifying software inventions, patent applicants
are free to use any terms they like-or even make up new ones-to
describe their software inventions. The scope of a patent's claims
will not always be obvious from a patent's title or abstract.27 And a
single software patent can claim multiple applications that are only
loosely connected to each other.28
One particularly illustrative example of the limits of keyword
searching is U.S. Patent No. 4 ,528,643-a "System for Reproducing
Information in Material Objects at a Point of Sale Location."29 The
25. The patent classification system tries to categorize patented inventions as
particular types. The Patent and Trademark Office assigns classification numbers
based only on the patent's claims, rather than the entire application. See U.S. PAT-
ENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE HANDBOOK OF CLASSIFI.
CATION 9 (2005), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/
handbook.pdf (cited in Fromer, supra note 24, at 586 n.212). John R. Allison and
Mark A. Lemley have discovered "numerous instances of what seem to be wrong or
arbitrary classification decisions." John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing
Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77, 92 (2002) (cited in
Fromer, supra, at 586). They note, "This problem is compounded by the fact that
some patents involve more than one type of technology, so that classifying them
into only a single category will necessarily mischaracterize them to some extent."
Id. at 92 n.49.
26. In addition to the USPTO website, numerous private companies provide
searchable databases of patents and related information. See, e.g., DELPHION, supra
note 24; PATBASE, supra note 24.
27. The purpose of a patent abstract is to merely "enable the United States
Patent and Trademark Office and the public generally to determine quickly from a
cursory inspection the nature and gist of the technical disclosure." 37 C.F.R.§ 1.72(b) (2012).
28. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b) (2012).
29. U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643, at [54] (filedJan. 10, 1983).
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invention that gave rise to the '643 patent was "a kiosk or vending
machine to be used in retail locations for producing digital music
tapes or other digital reproductions."3 0 The patent owner at-
tempted to enforce the patent against several software and publish-
ing companies, claiming that the sale and transfer of software and
documents over the Internet infringed the patent.3 ' The '643 pat-
ent was filed in 1983, long before "e-commerce" existed; indeed,
the web page and browser were not created until 1990.32 Nonethe-
less, litigation over the meaning of the '643 patent took over seven
years to complete.33
The '643 patent illustrates the difficulty with relying on
keywords to search for patents. The "Background of the Invention"
section of the patent discusses "retail outlets (point of sale loca-
tions)" and their difficulty deciding which recordings to stock.34
The patent makes no mention of the Internet or personal com-
puters. An attorney trying to determine ex ante whether the process
of selling and transferring software over the Internet had been pat-
ented would be unlikely to discover the '643 patent by conducting a
keyword search.35
30. SeeJAMEs BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 194 (2008). Read-
ers who find themselves confused as to what invention this patent describes are in
good company. The exact scope of the '643 patent is not clear, even after years of
litigation. The original application likely referred to a machine that could burn
custom music recordings so the store would not have to keep them in stock.
31. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc., v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2001). Catalina Marketing International, Inc. v. Coolsavings. com, Inc., 289
F.3d 801, 806-07 (Fed. Cir. 2002), presented a similar fact pattern.
32. See TIM BERNERs-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB 28-30 (1999).
33. See Order of Dismissal, Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., No.
95-6871 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003), ECF No. 224; Complaint, Interactive Gift Exp.
Inc., v. Compuserve Inc., No. 95-6871 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1995), ECF No. 1. The
Federal Circuit had held the term "point of sale location" could include one's
home. See Interactive Gift Exp., 256 F.3d at 1335. However, it also held that the
"material objects" referenced in the patent did not include a buyer's personal com-
puter because the objects had to be offered for sale, removed from the device that
wrote information to them after purchase, and intended for use on a device other
than that which wrote information to them. Id. at 1338. Nonetheless, litigation
following the Federal Circuit decision dragged on for one and a half years, con-
cluding with voluntary dismissals and numerous settlement agreements. See
Docket, Interactive Gift Exp. Inc., v. Compuserve Inc., No. 95-6871 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
7, 2001), ECF Nos. 184-86, 189, 201, 220-24 (dismissing parties, often after having
reached a settlement).
34. U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643 col. 1116-8; col. 2 1113-15 (filedJan. 10, 1983).
35. At first blush, one might suppose this problem could sometimes be
averted by the reverse doctrine of equivalents. "The reverse doctrine of equivalents
is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent unwarranted extension of the claims
beyond a fair scope of the patentee's invention." Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex,
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This problem is exacerbated by the complexity of software
products. Real software products often contain thousands-some-
times even millions-of lines of code.36 Given that a handful of
lines of code can constitute a patent-eligible invention, the number
of potentially patentable inventions in a 100,000-line computer pro-
gram can be very large. For example, the patent on raising a pop-up
browser window when one attempts to leave a webpage37 can be
infringed by writing a mere three lines.38
Hence, it is extremely difficult to anticipate all of the different
aspects of a particular computer program that might be regarded as
patent-eligible subject matter. It is even more difficult to anticipate
all of the terms patent applicants could use to describe those vari-
ous patentable concepts. The effectiveness of keyword searching is
further undermined by the doctrine of equivalents, which holds
that a patent can cover subject matter "equivalent" to its claims even
if it does not fall within their literal scope.39 This means that in
Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[W]here a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it
performs the same or similar function in a substantially different way, but never-
theless falls within the literal words of the claim, the [reverse] doctrine of
equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for
infringement." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
608-09 (1950) (citation omitted). However, the reverse doctrine of equivalents is
"all but defunct." See Long, supra note 7, at 519 (describing how the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit "proudly declare [d] that it has struck
down every successful assertion of the reverse doctrine of equivalents" (citing Tate
Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
36. See, e.g., MICRosorr, A History of Windows, http://windows.microsoft.com/
en-US/windows/history (last visited July 1, 2012) (noting that Windows XP was
compiled from 45 million lines of code); Stewart Brand, The Physicist, WIRED MAG.
(Sept. 1995), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.09/myhrvold.
html (interview with Nathan Myhrvold, estimating Microsoft Word consisted of two
million lines of code in 1995).
37. U.S. Patent No. 6,389,458 (filed Oct. 30, 1998).
38. See BEN KLEMENS, MATH YOU CAN'T USE 1-2 (2006). The three lines of
code necessary to create a pop up window when one attempts to leave a webpage
in JavaScript are:
function onExit() {
popup = window.open ("pop.html", "Don't go!")
popup.focus();}
Id. at 2.
39. A product or process may infringe a patent under the doctrine of
equivalents if it performs "substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result" as the patented invention. Graver Tank Mfg. Co.,
339 U.S. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)); see also WamerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40
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practice, a keyword-based patent search will either only find a frac-
tion of the relevant patents, or produce so many results that it
would be of little help to the searcher. 40
Other search strategies, such as searching by inventor, as-
signee, or citations in related patents, are no more promising. If a
firm knows of an existing patent similar to its product, these meth-
ods may be useful for finding closely-related patents. But as we have
seen, many different aspects of a software product may be patent-
eligible, and there is no reason to think that all the patents relevant
to a particular product will be linked together by citations, common
inventors, or other similarities.
It is theoretically possible that future improvements in artificial
intelligence will allow the creation of a search engine for software
patents as powerful as conventional chemical patent databases. This
search engine would have to be sophisticated enough to analyze a
real-world machine or process, make a comprehensive list of char-
acteristics that could constitute patent-eligible subject matter, pro-
duce a list of all possible terms that could be used to describe this
subject matter, and find all patents that use these terms in a way
that indicates possible infringement. But that technology doesn't
(1997) (explaining that the essential inquiry under the doctrine of equivalents is
whether "the accused product or process contain [s] elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention"). John R. Allison
and Mark A. Lemley argue, "[T]he doctrine of equivalents was . . . near death by
the late 1990s . . . [ and] district courts are more likely to reject doctrine of
equivalents claims today than ever before."John R. Allison & Mark. A. Lemley, The
(Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REv. 955, 958 (2007); see
also Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1371 (2010); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2011). Nonetheless, Samson Vermont
points out that "one of every four or five cases in which a patentee wins ajudgment
of infringement is . . . a judgment of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents . . . . [Doctrine of equivalents] scope is litigated frequently. One of
every two decisions on infringement is a decision on [doctrine of equivalents] in-
fringement." Samson Vermont, Taming the Doctrine of Equivalents in Light of Patent
Failure, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 85 (2008).
40. Although keyword searches will find many relevant patents, finding only
some relevant patents will not insulate an inventor from lawsuits or create incen-
tives to license or design around found patents. If you can only find 50% of the
patents on which your invention might infringe, there is little value in licensing or
designing around those patents because you can still be sued by the owners of the
other 50% of patents you did not find. Patent searching is not necessarily like
searching for legal cases where the cases are similar and related to each other, and
where, after a point, finding each new case produces diminishing returns. The first
and last patent you find are equally likely to bring an accidental infringer eco-
nomic ruin.
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exist right now, and we are skeptical it will exist any time soon. That
means the only reliable way to find all-not merely some-patents
infringed by a particular software product is to have a human being
look at all patents in software-related technology classes. So the dis-
covery costs of software patents for a single firm is roughly 0(n) in
the number of software patents, not 0(1) as with chemical patents.
The fact that the average firm has patent discovery costs that
are 0(n) in the number of patents is not a problem if the number of
firms and patents are both small. But the more firms and patents
there are, the larger the discovery costs will be.
Once again, the software industry is a good example of an in-
dustry where the patent system works poorly. The number of firms
producing patentable software is massive-much larger than the
number of firms in the software industry as it is conventionally de-
fined.4 1 Almost every medium and large American firm has an in-
formation technology ("IT") department that performs backups,
runs file and mail servers, runs the firm's website, and so forth.42 IT
professionals routinely create software to automate such tasks, and
this software is potentially patent-eligible. Many firms also develop
custom software to automate common business processes, and
some of it is quite complex.4 3 Hence, most medium and large
American firms (as well as many non-profits, universities, and other
organizations) are in the software industry as far as patent law is
concerned. 4 4
And as a consequence, many kinds of firms are the targets of
software patent lawsuits. 45 One complaint charged the Green Bay
Packers, Caterpillar, Peapod, OfficeMax, and Kraft Foods with in-
41. See KLEMENS, supra note 38, at 92.
42. Id. at 93.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 4-5 ("[A] patent on a piece of code is a restriction . . . on the
information technology department of every company in America, not to mention
every person who writes macros to facilitate his or her work . . . .").
45. Even frivolous allegations of patent infringement can be very expensive to
dispel. In 2005, the average cost of an opinion letter assessing the validity of a
patent and whether an accused party infringed was about $24,000. AM. INTELL.
PROP. LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECoNOMIc SURVEY 102 (2005) (cited in Matthew
Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform &Dfferential Impact, 8 MINN.J.L. Sci. & TECH. 1,
10 n.41 (2007)). Getting a patent invalidated in court costs on average $650,000.
Id. at 108 (cited in Sag & Rohde, supra, at 10 n.44). It is thus often economically
rational to pay high licensing fees for invalid patents that one did not even infringe
rather than have to participate in a lawsuit. "This is the real perversity of the cur-
rent patent system: rational actors will pay licensing fees for patents they strongly
suspect are either invalid, or simply do not apply to them, because each of the
alternatives is worse." Sag & Rohde, supra, at 11.
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fringing a patent for a "Remote Query Communications Sys-
tem"46-pecifically for having JPEG images on their websites.47
Another plaintiff filed lawsuits against firms such asJ. Crew and Lin-
ens 'N Things for infringing its "Information Processing Methodol-
ogy" patents4 8 by transmitting data that customers entered on the
defendants' websites.49 Other firms facing allegations of software
patent infringement include McDonalds, Barnes & Noble, Jamba
Juice, Aeropostale, 7-Eleven, and Oprah Winfrey's Harpo
Productions.50
Not only do firms outside of the conventional software industry
frequently produce potentially infringing software, they are also
granted the lion's share of software patents. James Bessen has
46. U.S. Patent No. 5,253,341 (filed Apr. 11, 1991).
47. Amended Complaint at 3, Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Green Bay
Packers, Inc., No. 00-4623 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2007), ECF No. 50. An attempt to
enforce the '341 patent in 2000 led to the invalidation of all sixteen claims, as well
as to the addition of a seventeenth claim. See Motion to Reinstate at 1, Techsearch
LLC v. Internet Entm't Grp., No. 00-4623 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2007), ECF No. 41; see
also id. at Ex. A (Ex parte Global Patent Holdings, LLC, Appeal No. 2006-0698,
Reexamination Control No. 90/005,742 (Dec. 26, 2006)). The amended com-
plaint, supra, charged the Green Bay Packers and other parties with violating the
new seventeenth claim, however an initial re-examination of the seventeenth claim
found it invalid on nineteen grounds. See Initial Office Action in Ex Parte Reex-
amination of U.S. Patent No. 5,253, 341, at 3-5 (July 22, 2008), available at http://
www.scribd.com/doc/4328073/jpg-patent-reexam. The case was dismissed without
prejudice pending the reexamination on March 4, 2009. See Minute Entry, Global
Patent Holdings LLC v. Green Bay Packers, No. 00-4623 (N.D. 2009), ECF No. 154;
Agreed Motion to Dismiss, Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Green Bay Packers,
Inc., No. 004623, 2009 WL 3059752 (N.D. Ill. 2009), E.C.F. No. 153.
48. U.S. Patent No. 7,184,162 (filed Apr. 15, 2005); U.S. Patent No. 7,075,673
(filed Nov. 6, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 6,683,697 (filed Dec. 9, 1999).
49. See Complaint at 1 14, 17, 20, Eon-Net L.P. v. J. Crew Inc., No. 07-10488
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007), ECF No. 1; Amended Complaint at 11 12, 15, Eon-Net,
L.P. v. Linens 'N Things, Inc., No. 06-315 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2006), ECF No. 15. The
cases were dismissed or settled before the court rendered a final judgment. See
Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Eon-Net, L.P. v. J. Crew Inc.,
No. 07-10488 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2008), ECF No. 11; Stipulation of Dismissal, Eon-
Net, L.P. v. Linens 'N Things, No. 06-315 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2007), ECF No. 23; Stipu-
lation of Dismissal, Eon-Net, L.P. v. Linens 'N Things, No. 06-315 (D.N.J. Dec. 22,
2006), ECF No. 22.
50. See Complaint, Card Activation Techs., Inc. v. 7-Eleven Inc., No. 10-4984
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2010), ECF No. 1; Complaint, Illinois Computer Research, LLC v.
Harpo Productions, Inc., No. 08-7322 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2008), ECF No. 1; Com-
plaint, Card Activation Techs., Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., No. 07-1230 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 2, 2007), ECF No. 1 (also naming Jamba Juice Co. and Aeropostale Inc. as
defendants); Complaint, Card Activation Techs., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., No. 06-
5578 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2006), ECF No. 1.
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found that 83% of software patents granted to public firms in 2006
went to firms outside of the conventional software industry.51
In our discussion of the widget industry, we stipulated that
each firm would hold exactly one patent and concluded that the
industry-wide discovery costs of widget patents are 0(n2 ). Obviously,
real industries aren't like that. Some firms have many patents and
others have none at all. So it's more precise to say that the patent
system's discovery costs in non-indexable industries are 0(nfnp),
where n, is the number of firms and n, is the number of patents.
The widget industry in our example is a special case where n=n=np,
so that total discovery costs are 0(n2).
In the software industry, nf np, but n and up are both large. As
we have seen, most medium and large firms produce patent-eligible
software. There are roughly 635,000 firms in the United States with
twenty or more employees. 5 2 While not all of these firms produce
software, many of the 1.7 million firms with five to nineteen em-
ployees do, so we'll estimate the number of firms that create
software, nf, to be 600,000 firms. And np, the number of software
patents issued, is around 40,000 in a typical year (and growing) .5
That means that there are around twenty-four billion new patent-
firm pairs each year that could produce accidental infringement.
Even if a patent lawyer only needed to look at a patent for ten min-
utes, on average, to determine whether any part of a particular
firm's software infringed it,54 it would require roughly two million
patent attorneys, working full-time, to compare every firm's prod-
51. James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. Sci. TECH. L. 241,
256 (2012) (showing only 17.2% of software patents granted to public firms were
granted to firms in the computer services and software industries).
52. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 635,000 businesses with
twenty or more employees in 2008, and 1.7 million firms with five to ninteen em-
ployees. See Statistics About Business Size (including Small Business) from the Census Bu-
reau, CENSUS BuREAu HOMEPAGE, http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html
(last visited Dec. 9, 2011).
53. See Bessen, supra note 51, at 253.
54. Ten minutes is an unrealistically low amount of time. Patentable software
can be written in only a few lines, see supra note 27, and many software programs
consist of millions of lines of code. See, e.g., MICROSOFr supra note 36 (noting that
Windows XP was compiled from 45 million lines of code); Brand, supra note 36
(interview with Nathan Myhrvold, estimating Microsoft Word consisted of two mil-
lion lines of code in 1995). It is plainly beyond human capacity for an attorney to
be able to hold in his or her mind everything that a large software program does,
let alone to compare it to the content of a patent in a matter of minutes.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
304
SCALING THE PATENT SYSTEM
ucts with every patent issued in a given year.55 At a rate of $100 per
hour, that would cost $400 billion. For comparison, the software
industry was valued at $225.5 billion in 2010.56
Obviously, $400 billion is a highly speculative figure. But the
exact number doesn't matter because there are only around 40,000
registered patent attorneys and agents in the United States.57 Even
if the entire patent bar worked full-time on patent clearance for
software firms, there wouldn't be nearly enough lawyers to go
around.
E. Example: Discovery Costs for Corkscrews Are Low Because
There Are Few Corkscrew Patents
We have argued that discovery costs are low for the pharma-
ceutical industry because chemical patents are indexable by chemi-
cal formula. But even non-indexable patent classes can have modest
discovery costs if np, the number of potentially-relevant patents, is
small enough.
For example, consider corkscrews. A search of corkscrew-re-
lated technology classes58 reveals that 301 utility patents were
awarded between 1992 and 2011. Just five of these were issued in
2011.
We have argued that it would be impossible for anyone to read
and understand the hundreds of thousands of existing software pat-
ents, or even to keep up with the hundreds of software patents the
patent office issues each week. But it would only take a few weeks to
read and understand the 301 utility patents related to corkscrews.59
Given that only about fifteen patents are issued in corkscrew-related
technology classes in a typical year, it would be fairly easy for an
55. The math behind this is straightforward: 40,000 patents*600,000
firms*(10 minutes per patent-firm pair)/(2,000 hours of work per attorney *60
minutes per hour)=2 million attorneys.
56. Software: Global Industry Guide 2010, DATA MONITOR RESEARCH STORE
(2012), available at http://www.datamonitor.com/store/Product/software-global
industry-guide_2010?productid=4FO26C5C-EBCC-4193-AD27-77260196E7F5.
57. See Patent Attorney/Agent Search, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OF-
FICE, https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/query.jsp (search for "US" in the country
field) (last visited Dec. 11, 2011).
58. We used patent classes 81/3.2, 81/3.4, 81/3.7, 81/3.9, 81/3.29, 81/3.36,
81/3.37, 81/3.45, 81/3.48. See e.g., Full-Text and Image Database, UNITED STATES
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (current through Oct. 16, 2012), http://patftl.us
pto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html.
59. For example, if we assume that it takes an hour, on average, to understand
a corkscrew-related patent, then it would take approximately eight forty-hour work-
weeks to familiarize oneself with all 301 corkscrew-related utility patents.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
2012] 305
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 68:289
attorney who specialized in corkscrew patents to keep abreast of
new patents.
In March 2012, Amazon.com listed 4,551 corkscrews for sale in
its "home and kitchen" section, made by 737 manufacturers.6 0 Not
every firm manufacturing corkscrews is listed on Amazon.com, but
it's reasonable to assume a majority of the commercially significant
ones are. So we'll estimate that n, the number of firms in the cork-
screw industry, is no more than 1,500.
We have already estimated that np=301 for corkscrews. If we
again assume that each firm-patent comparison takes ten minutes,
then it would take approximately 75,250 hours to conduct patent
clearance for all corkscrews currently on the market.61 That would
require the services of approximately forty patent attorneys working
full-time for a year.
And of course, this process wouldn't need to be repeated every
year. In a typical year, firms would only need to clear their new
products and compare their existing products with newly-issued
patents. So in a typical year, the corkscrew industry would require
the services of significantly fewer than forty full-time patent
attorneys.
Moreover, the fact that there are few enough patents that a
single person could read and understand all of them means that
the vetting process is likely to be considerably more efficient for
corkscrews than for software. A patent is much harder to under-
stand the first time it's read than on the second, fifth, or twentieth
encounter. There are so many software patents that no one could
possibly read more than a small fraction of them, so attorneys doing
software patent clearance spend most of their time reading patents
for the first time. In contrast, attorneys that specialize in corkscrews
would be looking at the same 301 patents over and over again.
Their familiarity with the corkscrew patents would allow them to
quickly identify which were relevant to a particular client's
products.
Hence, the fact that a patent class is non-indexable does not
necessarily mean that discovery costs will be prohibitively high. If
60. AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited March 2012) (search
for "corkscrews" in the category "Home and Kitchen"; click on "see more" hyper-
link under "brands.").
61. 301*1,500=451,500 comparisons. If each takes ten minutes, this will take
451,500/6=75,250 hours of work. Obviously, 10 minutes per comparison is a rough
estimate, but one that suffices to illustrate the point that corkscrew patent discov-
ery costs are several orders of magnitude smaller than software patent discovery
costs.
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np, the total number of patents in that technology class, is small,
then the "brute force" approach of examining every patent may be
feasible.
III.
DISORGANIZED PATENTS HAVE LED TO A
LITIGATION EXPLOSION
In practice, firms don't-and can't-spend whatever it takes to
avoid infringement. Rather, they spend only as much money on
patent searches as they believe will "pay off' in lower future litiga-
tion and licensing costs.6 2 In industries with low discovery costs, a
rational firm is likely to spend enough money to find all patents
relevant to its products. Inadvertent infringement in these indus-
tries is rare. On the other hand, in industries where discovery costs
are high, the rational firm might not even try to avoid infringe-
ment, because a dollar spent on patent searches will produce much
less than a dollar in savings due to reduced litigation.
Unsurprisingly, the software industry-and, indeed, the larger
IT industry of which it is a part-is in the latter category. In a
widely-cited paper, Mark Lemley documents the widespread IT in-
dustry practice of ignoring patents and tries to explain why IT firms
behave as they do.63 He suggests several explanations: patent nego-
tiations take a long time, patent holders may not be willing to offer
reasonable terms, many patents turn out to be invalid, and the
number of patents a given firm must license would be large.64
These are all plausible explanations, but there is a more important
and fundamental one: firms have no cost-effective way of obtaining
a complete list of relevant patents in the first place. Licensing the
few they know about provides no protection against the many
others they have not yet discovered.
Lemley notes that the pharmaceutical industry is one of the
few industries that does not ignore patents, and he attributes the
difference to the fact that the FDA forces patent holders to disclose
relevant patents. 65 But such disclosures can only be compiled into a
useful form because chemical patents are indexable. Without chem-
ical formula as an organizational scheme, it would not be possible
62. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of Patented Inven-
tions, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 53, 55 (2011) ("Information costs and transaction costs
may dwarf potential gains to users from identifying and clearing rights . . . .").
63. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 21 (2008).
64. Id. at 25-29.
65. Id. at 29-30.
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to create a publication like the Orange Book that allows rapid re-
trieval of patents relevant to a particular real-world product.
The empirical evidence on litigation costs is consistent with
our hypothesis about the importance of discovery costs. We should
expect industries with high discovery costs to have high rates of in-
advertent infringement and, as a consequence, high rates of litiga-
tion. In their 2008 book Patent Failure, James Bessen and Mike
Meurer used stock market event studies to estimate the total costs
of patent litigation for various industries during the 1980s and
1990s. They found that litigation costs for chemical patents are
much lower than the profits from these patents. 66 This happy state
of affairs can be explained by the low discovery costs of chemical
patents-litigation is rare because infringement is rare.
Bessen and Meurer found litigation costs were much higher
for non-chemical patents. From 1984 until 1994, the costs of litiga-
tion over non-chemical patents were roughly equal to the profits
from those patents. 6 7 And from 1994 to until the end of their study
period in 1999, the costs of litigation over non-chemical patents in-
creased dramatically.68
Why was there a spike starting in the mid-1990s? Between 1989
and 1998, courts made it dramatically easier to obtain patents on
software and business methods.69 Bessen and Meurer found that
these patents contributed a disproportionate share of patent litiga-
tion. Software patents were more than twice as likely to be involved
in patent litigation as other kinds of patents. 70 The closely-related
category of business method patents was nearly seven times as likely
to be involved in litigation.71 This is not surprising. We have already
seen that software patents have particularly high discovery costs,
and business method patents have high discovery costs for similar
reasons.
66. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 30, at 139 fig.6.5.
67. Id. at 138-39.
68. Id.
69. The Federal Circuit began upholding patents on software in In re
Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989), and In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). In 1998, the Federal Circuit eliminated the com-
mon-law ban on business method patents in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signa-
ture Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For a more general
discussion of the expansion of patentable subject matter to cover software, see
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DuFFY, PATENT LAw & POLIcY 151-55
(4th ed. 2007).
70. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 30, at 22, 153 fig.7.2
71. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
308
SCALING THE PATENT SYSTEM
IV.
POLICY SUGGESTIONS: BEYOND PATENT QUALITY
We have shown that for technology classes with high discovery
costs, the patent system is unlikely to ever work like a traditional
property system. Rampant infringement is inevitable because firms
have no way to discover which patents they are infringing. Because
of this, firms have little incentive to even attempt to clear patent
rights before introducing new products into the market.
No one would claim this state of affairs is ideal, but is this sys-
tem the best we can do?
We don't think so. The patent system is supposed to be a
mechanism for promoting the progress of the useful arts by trans-
ferring resources from the users of technologies to their inventors.
But in industries where discovery costs are high, it does so in an
erratic, wasteful, and unjust fashion. The system resembles a lottery
more than a system of property rights-an unlucky minority of in-
fringers is the target of ruinous lawsuits, and only a minority of pat-
ent owners "win" by catching infringers who pay up.
Not only is this unfair to the targets of these lawsuits, but it
creates a generalized disincentive to innovate. Developing new
products comes with the risk of incurring crippling liability and
having one's business enjoined-precisely the opposite of the effect
patents are supposed to have. And, of course, many of the resources
consumed by the patent system flow not to inventors, but to pay
patent attorneys and cover the patent system's other deadweight
costs.
Many observers have argued that patent law reforms should fo-
cus on increasing patent "quality."72 They usually mean that more
patents should be invalidated for obviousness or non-novelty and
that patents should have narrower and clearer claims. These are
worthwhile goals to be sure. But they do not directly address the
discovery cost problem.
There is no reason to think obvious or non-novel patents cost
more to discover than "high quality" patents. So reforms that invali-
date "low quality" patents reduce discovery costs only because they
72. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADE1UARK OFFICE, 2010-2015 STRATEGIC PLAN
9-25 (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO-2010-
2015_StrategicPlan.pdf (describing initiatives to improve patent examination
timelines and patent quality); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DIsCONTNTS 171, 178-81 (2004) (discussing ways to improve patent quality); John
R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One
Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729
(2006).
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reduce the total number of patents being issued. That is valuable,
of course, but really dramatic changes would be needed to invali-
date enough patents to bring discovery costs under control in large,
non-indexable industries like software.
Nor are high discovery costs primarily due to unclear patent
boundaries. Unclear boundaries do raise discovery costs, since they
require patent attorneys to spend more time examining each pat-
ent. But recall that we began our analysis with the counterfactual
assumption that widget patents have perfectly clear boundaries. So
discovery cost problems will crop up even where patent boundaries
are crystal clear. Problems related to unclear patent boundaries ex-
ist in addition to the basic discovery cost problems that are the fo-
cus of this article.
There are several strategies the government could take to re-
duce discovery costs, ranging from making small changes to radi-
cally restructuring the patent system. Here we look at a few
categories of policy changes that would lessen discovery costs to va-
rious degrees.
A. Subject Matter Restriction
The preceding analysis suggests that the patent system will
work well when there is a clear and comprehensive way to index
patents-reducing the entire industry's patent discovery time to
O(nf) rather than O(nfnp). And the patent system will also work bet-
ter when nf or n, is very small-i.e., in industries with a small num-
ber of firms or inventions.
Together, these criteria arrange technologies on a spectrum.
At one end of the spectrum are pharmaceuticals, an industry that is
highly concentrated, has relatively few inventions, and can use
chemical formulas to organize its patents. At the other end of the
spectrum is software, an industry that is highly decentralized, pro-
duces many patents, and has no standardized classification system.
Notice that the factors that make software patents work poorly
are characteristics of software itself and the software industry, not
the patent system. This suggests that it is probably not possible to
make the patent system work well for software. The basic problem is
that there is a massive number of firms producing potentially-in-
fringing software, a massive number of software patents, and no sys-
tematic way to organize them all. That is, discovery costs grow as
O(nf np), and n and np are both large numbers. Changes to patent
law probably can not make software inventions indexable, and
policymakers certainly should not try to reduce the number of
firms.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
310
SCALING THE PATENT SYSTEM
The fact that some categories of patentable subject matter have
much higher discovery costs than others suggests an obvious policy
response: exclude subject matter with high discovery costs from pat-
ent eligibility.73 The strongest version of this reform would be to
exclude all non-indexable technology classes from patent eligibil-
ity.74 Or policymakers might exclude only those non-indexable cat-
egories for which litigation costs are highest.
The problem of high discovery costs provides a strong ratio-
nale for courts' traditional prohibition on patents on abstract
ideas.75 The more abstract an invention is, the more different par-
73. Excluding inventions with high discovery costs from patentability will not
necessarily have deleterious effects. There are many arguments that software pat-
ents are not necessary to incentivize software development and that copyright, a
sui generis regime, or no protection at all would be sufficient to encourage new
innovation in software. These arguments are beyond the scope of this paper, but
for more discussion, see generally KLEMENS, supra note 38, at 17-23; Pamela Samuel-
son, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 2308, 2404 (arguing for a sui generis intellectual property regime to pro-
tect software); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025,
1148-53 (1990); Timothy B. Lee, Patently Absurd - Copyright Law Can Meet the Needs
of Software Developers, NAT'L REv. (Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.cato.org/
publications/commentary/patently-absurd-copyright-law-can-meet-needs-software-
developers; Timothy B. Lee, The Case against Literary (and Software) Patents,
TECHKNOWLEDGE (August 28, 2009), available at http://www.cato.org/publica-
tions/techknowledge/case-against-literary-software-patents; Wendy Seltzer, Software
Patents and/or Software Development (Har. Univ. - Berman Ctr. for Internet & Soc.
TPRC 2011, Sept. 24, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985780 (argu-
ing software patents retard software development).
74. The patent system is often described as a "bargain with the public in
which the inventor gives information about the invention in exchange for an ex-
clusive right." Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REv. 709
745 (2012) (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 225 (2003) (referring to a
patent as a "quid pro quo" for disclosure)); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (identifying the fact that the patent system "pro-
motes disclosure of inventions" as one of its key functions); Fromer, supra note 24,
at 542; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARv.
J.L. & TECH. 531, 532 (2012). If non-indexable patents are, in practice, undiscover-
able, then the justification behind this "bargain" is significantly diminished be-
cause even fully disclosed patents would be relatively obscured among the many
other nonindexable patents.
75. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("Excluded from such
patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.")
(citations omitted); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("The laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patenta-
ble.") (citations omitted); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) ("'Phenomena
of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual con-
cepts are not patentable. ) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)).
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ties are likely to use it for different purposes, and the more flexibil-
ity parties will have to describe it.76 All of these factors mean that
more abstract patents will produce particularly high discovery costs
and, as a consequence, particularly high rates of inadvertent in-
fringement and litigation.
At one time, software and business method patents were con-
sidered too abstract to constitute patentable subject matter, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took a more
permissive stance towards software and business method patents
during the 1990s." The result has been an unprecedented explo-
sion of litigation related to software and business method patents.78
The Federal Circuit's de facto legalization of software and business
method patents was a mistake and should be reversed.
76. For example, the relationship between energy and mass (e=mc') has appli-
cations for the study of radioactivity, space travel, nuclear energy, and the composi-
tion of the universe. See Peter Tyson, The Legacy of E=MC, NOVA (Oct. 11, 2005),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/physics/legacy-of-e-equals-mc2.html. A patent
application purporting to cover e=mc' could be described in terms of any of these
applications.
77. Before the 1990s, courts generally held that software was not patentable.
In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the Supreme Court invalidated a pro-
cess patent on software for converting signals from binary-coded decimal into bi-
nary, emphasizing that "[p]henomena of nature, . . . mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts [we]re not patentable." Id. at 67. The Court found
that granting the patent "in practical effect would [grant] a patent on the [conver-
sion] algorithm itself," id. at 72, and indicated that patents on software programs
were beyond the scope of the patent statute, absent legislative change. See id. at
72-73.
Following Benson, patent drafters attempted to redraft abstract process claims
into claims for making a new machine, in the hopes of concealing any resem-
blance of their claims to the process claims at issue in Benson. See ROBERT PATRICK
MERGES &JOHN FITZGERALD DuFFY, PATENT LAw AND POLIcY 151-53 (4th ed. 2007).
This tactic succeeded when the Federal Circuit upheld machine claims for
software in In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989), and In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). The Federal Circuit in Alappat acknowl-
edged that "many, or arguably even all, of the means elements recited in [the
claim] represent circuitry elements that perform mathematical calculations." 33
F.3d at 1544. Nonetheless, the majority concluded, "This [claim] is not a disem-
bodied mathematical concept . .. but rather a specific machine to produce a use-
ful, concrete, and tangible result." Id.
In 1998, the Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (eliminating the common-law
ban on business method patents).
78. In 2008, software patents were more than twice as likely to be litigated as
other patents, and business method patents were nearly seven times more likely to
be litigated than other patents. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 30, at 22, 153 fig.7.2.
In the late 1990s, software patents accounted for 38% of the cost of patent litiga-
tion for public firms. Id. at 22.
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An enumeration of other technology classes with high discov-
ery costs is beyond the scope of this paper, but would be a worth-
while subject for future study.
One alternative to exclusions based on subject matter would be
to vary the application fee for patents based on the estimated dis-
covery costs of each technology class. The patent office would take
into account the indexability of the technology classes and the
number of firms practicing in it. A party applying for a chemical
patent would thus have to pay a very low fee, whereas the fee for
patents in software-related technology classes would be drastically
increased.79 This would decrease n, over time by discouraging ap-
plications for patents in areas with high discovery costs.80
B. Independent Invention
Another powerful reform would be to create an independent
invention defense to patent infringement."' Ninety to ninety-eight
percent of modern patent lawsuits are filed against independent
79. In 2001, Mark A. Lemley estimated that the cost of prosecuting a patent
was between $10,000 and $30,000. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1498 (2001). A change in patent application
fees would have to be significant in relation to the already high costs of hiring
attorneys to draft and prosecute the patent.
80. Peter S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer similarly suggest that the cost of
evaluating patent applications "should be borne by the applicants and should be
tailored to the costs of examining particular applications (or at least classes of
applications)." Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Exter-
nalities 35 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 11-58,
Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 11-58, Stanford Law and
Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 418, UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No.
1973171, Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=19 73171.
81. Other authors have written about the possibility of creating an indepen-
dent invention defense to patent infringement. See generally, e.g., John S. Leibovitz,
Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251 (2002) (suggesting that it
would be economically efficient for independent inventors to receive independent
patents on the same invention); Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require
Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1525 (2007); Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Con-
cept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643 (2010); Stephen M. Maurer &
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property, 69
EcONOMicA 535 (2002), available at http://www.dklevine.com/archive/scotchmer-
independent-invention.pdf (arguing that independent creation defense would
preserve incentives to invent, but also permit more efficient use of inventions);
Elisabetta Ottoz & Franco Cugno, The Independent Invention Defence in a Cournot
Duopoly Model, ECON. BULL., June 20, 2004, at 1-7, available at http://www.
economicsbulletin.com/ 2 0 04 /volumel2/EB-04L10005A.pdf; Samson Vermont,
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REv. 475, 480
(2007).
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inventors, not copiers.82 Independent inventors develop and com-
mercialize inventions without copying from existing, patented in-
ventions. Patent owners who have patented the same invention and
who identify an independent inventor can exact licensing fees or
even stop the invention's use by the independently-inventing party
entirely.83 This system hurts independent inventors and the public
by forcing independent inventors to negotiate licensing fees to
keep their existing products on the market-or by removing other-
wise-successful products from the market.
There is an extensive literature on proposed independent in-
vention defenses,84 and a full consideration of the arguments for
and against such a defense is beyond the scope of this paper. None-
theless, we note that in principle, an independent invention de-
fense could reduce discovery costs to zero. With an independent
invention defense on the books, patent holders would still have the
security of knowing that a competitor could not copy their work, but
independent parties who happened to create something that in-
fringed a patent would not be liable to the patent holders. Inven-
tors would also have no obligation to search for patents they
potentially were infringing because so long as they were not copy-
ing another's work, their inventions would be safe from patent
lawsuits.
C. Limiting Injunctions and Multiplied Damages
for Patent Infiringement
A final reform would be to limit patent remedies for infringe-
ment of non-indexable patents to actual damages, rather than per-
82. Lemley, supra note 74, at 713 (citing Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A.
Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1421, 1424 (2009)). Notably, the
prevalence of independent invention acts as evidence that the patent system is
frequently unnecessary to spur invention. Independent inventors often develop
and commercialize the very same inventions others have patented. The fact that a
later party developed and commercialized a patented invention independently in-
dicates that it was not necessary to award the original patentee a patent in order
for society to benefit from the invention. See Lemley, supra note 81, at 1527 (citing
Vermont, supra note 81).
83. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388 (2006) (describing test for injunctive relief under the patent act).
84. See Leibovitz, supra note 81; Lemley, supra note 81; Liivak, supra note 81;
Long, supra note 7, at 525-33; Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 81; Roger Milgrim,
An Independent Invention Defense to Patent Infringement: The Academy Talking to Itself
Should Anyone Listen?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK. OFF. Soc'y 295 (2008); Ottoz &
Cugno, supra note 81; Vermont, supra note 81.
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mitting injunctive relief and multiplied damage awards.85 In other
words, remedies for patent infringement could be limited to those
instantiating "liability rules" rather than "property rules."
"Property rules" are designed to prevent parties from using an-
other's asset without permission.86 In the case of patent law, its
property rule system "include [s] injunctions and supercompen-
satory damages that would make [patent infringement] less attrac-
tive than bargaining to a consensual price with the [patent]
owner."87 In contrast, "liability rules" such as lost profits or a royalty,
theoretically allow parties to infringe on another's patent "as long
as . .. officially determined damages are paid. The level of the dam-
ages is set to compensate the owner," rather than punish the
infringer.88
Generally speaking, property-rule remedies are considered
beneficial when transaction costs between property holders and
those who want to acquire property are low.89 As Stewart Sterk
explains:
Because property rules require all potential users of a resource
to buy rights from th[e resource] owner, property rules enable
the owner to accumulate information about potential bidders
and the values those bidders attach to those rights. As a result,
property rules enable resource owners to channel those re-
sources to the bidders who value them most-promoting effi-
cient use of resources.90
85. Currently, patent infringers may be enjoined from future infringement
and made to pay damages in the form of a reasonable royalty or lost profits. See 35
U.S.C. § 283 (" [Clourts. . .may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles
of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as
the court deems reasonable."); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (Courts may award "dam-
ages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court. . .. [T]he court may increase the damages
up to three times the amount found or assessed.").
86. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972); Henry
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719, 1720 (2004).
87. Smith, supra note 86, at 1720.
88. Id.
89. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MIcH. L. REV. 1285, 1290 (2008) (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1106-10, 1118 (1972)) (explaining that Guido Calabresi
and A. Douglas Melamed observed that "property rules are efficient in cases of low
transaction costs, while liability rules are preferable in cases of high transaction
costs").
90. Id. at 1295 (footnote omitted).
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But property rules fail to promote the efficient use of resources
when transaction costs are high. The combination of very high
transaction costs (e.g., the costs of locating a patent holder to nego-
tiate a license with) and punitive legal penalties (e.g., an injunction
or multiplied damages for infringement) can prevent beneficial
uses of property and waste resources by making property use very
costly.91
Permitting property-rule remedies in patent law is harmful be-
cause the discovery costs of locating relevant patents render transac-
tion costs too high for many non-indexable patents.92 It is not
merely costly for potential infringers of non-indexable patents to
locate the patents they might infringe-it is completely impractica-
ble. As a result, firms are faced with a disincentive to develop new
products because of the liability that could result if those products
infringed others' patents. Firms cannot determine ex ante what is
infringing, but an injunction ex post could be crippling.
Once a product or process has been designed in a way that
incorporates a patented invention, redesigning the product
might require shutdown for retooling. In addition, especially
when the patented invention is a small component in the de-
sign of a complex product or process, a redesign around the
patented invention may take substantial effort .... .3
In this case, a patent owner may then exact enormous licensing
fees from an accidental infringer that the infringer would not have
agreed to if the infringed patent had been identified in the prod-
uct-development stage. Eliminating property-rule remedies-specif-
ically eliminating injunctions and multiplied damages-would
lessen the disincentives to producers created by the high discovery
costs of the patent system.94 This proposal does not constitute a
91. See id. at 1290.
92. See id. at 1296 ("Only if potential resource users know that use of the re-
source would intrude on someone else's property right, and can readily identify
the owner of that right, will they approach the owner to act as an information
clearing-house."); id. at 1304 ("[C]ompared to a liability-rule regime, a property-
rule regime creates excessive incentives to search [to determine the scope of one's
legal rights] even when the search costs are high, [and] the probability of en-
croachment [on another's right] is relatively low . . . ."); see also id. at 1311 ("Be-
cause the consequences of using without search are so draconian [in a property-
rule regime], the user will often be willing to undertake an expensive search even
when the probability of liability is very low.").
93. Id. at 1333.
94. For a more detailed discussion in favor of awarding non-punitive royalties,
see Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement
Deterrent, 74 Mo. L. REV. 909 (2009).
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complete solution: litigation costs are still very high, and potential
infringers and patent holders will still dispute the existence of liabil-
ity and the size of damages. But it would be a step in the right
direction.
A more modest proposal would combine this proposal and the
previous one: limit injunctions and multiplied damages to cases
where the plaintiff can demonstrate that actual copying took place.
Under this approach, independent inventors would still be subject
to liability for infringement, but their products could not be en-
joined and their damages would be limited to a reasonable royalty
rate determined by a judge. In contrast, a party caught copying an-
other's invention would be subject to harsher remedies, including
injunctions and heightened damages.
CONCLUSION
The patent system is supposed to promote the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts, but in some industries it seems to be doing
just the opposite. The sheer number of patents and firms, and the
lack of an effective organizational scheme for patents, can mean
that patent clearance is practically impossible. In software, for ex-
ample, patent clearance would require the services of many more
patent attorneys than exist in the United States. In short, the patent
system doesn't scale.
It's a fundamental problem that inventions in certain indus-
tries are not indexable, and incremental changes to the patent
rules, such as beefing up the novelty and obviousness requirements,
are not going to fix the problem. Only dramatic reforms-such as
excluding industries with high discovery costs from patent protec-
tion, establishing an independent invention defense, or eliminating
injunctions-can return the patent system to its proper role of pro-
moting innovation.
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